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As our primary mode of contact with the world, perception is
the causal and informational foundation for our higher cogni-
tive functions—it guides our thinking about and acting upon
the world. It is therefore unsurprising that so much empirical
and theoretical research is devoted to the study of the complex
interrelations between perception and cognition. Nor is it surpris-
ing that such research spans traditional disciplinary boundaries
and attracts the interest and efforts of researchers from the full
spectrum of the cognitive sciences, psychology, neuroscience, phi-
losophy, and others. This Research Topic aims to contribute to
this expansive research project—the exploration of the percep-
tion/cognition interface—while respecting its essentially interdis-
ciplinary character.
Given that perception is the input to cognition, the two systems
must be able to “talk” to each other; at the very least, information
carried by perception must be of a form adequate to be “taken
in” by our various cognitive systems. The central questions of this
Research Topic surround the nature of their “communication.” In
particular, we ask: what kinds of structural relations must hold
between perceptual and cognitive representations for such com-
munication to be possible? To what extent, if at all, is it a “dialog?”
And, what mechanisms mediate the transitions between the two
systems? As the papers here included exemplify, all these ques-
tions are open to exploration from within a variety of different
disciplines and perspectives.
The question on the structural relation between perception
and cognition is addressed by Tacca (2011) who argues that there
are important structural similarities between early vision and
higher cognitive systems underlying active empirical thought—in
particular, she argues that both involve systematic representa-
tions. Given that systematicity is a central feature of representa-
tions employing conceptual capacities, the systematicity of early
vision implies that it might count as an early type of conceptual
representation. Such a view helps explain how perceptual repre-
sentations can inform our thoughts about the world. Raftopoulos
(2011), on the other hand, proposes that early vision might not
involve cognition-like structural properties, though he continues
to argue that late vision is cognitively penetrable and not purely
visual. Nonetheless, unlike representations involved in higher
cognition, late vision representations do not support inferences
and discursive reasoning. This view is shared by Tacca, who, for
this reason, considers perceptual representations as an early type
of conceptual representations.
Roth and Franconeri (2012) suggest a further property
shared between vision and high-level cognition: asymmetry.
The asymmetry in question is found in spatial language: in
sentences like “A is above B,” A and B are assigned differ-
ent roles: the first is the “figure” and the other “ground.”
Similarly, they argue, in vision, the perception of A being
above B may be asymmetrically encoded such that the one is
at the “spotlight” of attention, and has a certain, behaviorally
manifest, priority over the other. They further implicate spa-
tial attention as the mechanism underlying this asymmetric
encoding.
Potter (2012) explores which mechanism might mediate
between perception and cognition by reviewing evidence for
conceptual short-term memory—a mental buffer in which per-
ceptual stimuli and their related concepts come together for a
brief time. This allows for the identification of meaningful pat-
terns and structures. Potter considers perception and cognition as
roughly continuous—as different processing stages operating on
the same representational format.
Another possible mechanism linking perception and cogni-
tion is attention. Brown et al. (2011) expand upon the thought
that attention mediates spatial visual perception and investigate
its possible role in biasing proprioceptive signals in the motor
system. They investigate further possible similarities between the
attentional mechanisms underlying spatial perception and those
operating on proprioceptive inputs.
Goldstone et al. (2011) investigate a specific perceptual mech-
anism that might be influenced by cognition: the extraction of
distant similarities. They suggest that high-level cognition directs
attention so as to modulate what they call “categorical percep-
tion.” They argue that perception is plastic and that “it is not
just perceptual sensitivities that are driving the categories, but
rather the acquired categories are also driving perceptual sensi-
tivities, (p. 385).” They further emphasize: “There is little, if any,
gap between perception and high-level cognition because per-
ceptual systems adapt to fit the needs of high-level cognition,
(p. 385).” Perception is suffused by cognition. Goldstone et al.’s
account is based on the so-called feature-based approach to con-
cepts; namely, the idea that concepts are composed of perceptual
stimuli.
Stöckle-Schobel (2012) reviews the success of the feature-
based approach to concept acquisition (see, Schyns and Rodet,
1997; Goldstone and Barsalou, 1998; Barsalou, 1999; Goldstone
et al., 2011). He argues that if a feature-based theory of con-
cept learning is to be successful it must address a number of
philosophical challenges originally posed by Fodor (1981, 2008)
against the possibility of acquiring genuinely novel concepts.
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He argues that these challenges have not been fully met by
the feature-based approach, and provides recommendations for
how proponents of such an approach might eventually meet
them.
Tanaka et al. (2012) further explore the role of categoriza-
tion in the process of perceptual recognition. They do so via an
exploration of the atypicality bias—the finding that objects that
are equally similar to two examples of the same category will
be perceived as more similar to the more atypical of the two.
This suggests that perceptual recognition of some object is influ-
enced by the density and organization of exemplars in the object’s
category space.
Lebrecht et al. (2012) focus on the affective content of
perceptual representations. They argue that even the very subtle
valence, or micro-valence, of an object has a significant uncon-
scious influence on how those objects are perceptually repre-
sented and recognized. They argue that such effects are so robust
that affect can be understood as a straightforwardly perceptible
property of objects.
Finally, Mroczko-Wa˛sowicz and Werning (2012) provide a
sensory-motor account of synesthesia that considers the role of
top–down associations in shaping the synesthetic experience.
Particularly, they argue that swimming style synesthesia can be
seen as a case of hyperbinding that—unlike normal binding
(Barsalou, 2008)—combines sensory attributes that do not nor-
mally form a concept frame. This interpretation calls for a larger
integration between visuo-motor representations and conceptual
representations.
Taken together the papers in “Linking Perception and
Cognition” offer a wide perspective of the theoretical and empiri-
cal research on the nexus between how we perceive the world and
how we think about it. These papers provide useful guides toward
better understanding the connections that make our mental life
so rich, indeed, that make it possible at all.
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